Automation & Ops policy-enginehuman-approvalaudit-trailmcpkubernetesnats

Cordum Agent Control Plane

Govern risky AI-agent actions with policy checks, human approval, and auditable evidence before execution.

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What does this agent do, and when should you use it?

Cordum is a self-hosted agent control plane that evaluates policy, blocks actions, or requests human approval before autonomous agents execute. Its full stack includes an API Gateway, Scheduler, Safety Kernel, Workflow Engine, Context Engine, NATS, TLS-secured Redis, and a React dashboard. Jobs enter through the Gateway, are governed by the Scheduler and Safety Kernel, and can be executed by CAP-compatible workflows and workers that return audit events. It also exposes MCP in stdio and HTTP/SSE modes, while Cordum Edge adds a local command hook, approvals, and redacted evidence export for Claude Code tool calls. Deployment boundaries include Docker Compose, Helm/Kubernetes, and the Go SDK; Python and Node SDKs are listed as separate packages.

A client can submit a job with topic and prompt to POST https://localhost:8081/api/v1/jobs, authenticated by X-API-Key and X-Tenant-ID. The API Gateway accepts the job, the Scheduler coordinates Safety Kernel policy evaluation, and the result can be ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVAL; the Workflow Engine orchestrates workflows. CAP workers can register a topic handler such as job.summarize through runtime.Register and start with agent.Start(). cordumctl edge claude renders a temporary settings.json, starts cordum-agentd on a local loopback nonce, and governs Claude Code tool calls through a command hook; approved destructive actions also require a resolved approval audit event matching the tenant, approval_ref, and action_hash. The dashboard can show session timelines, and Edge exports redacted evidence bundles.

  1. A platform engineering team needs policy checks and human approval before agent-initiated Terraform, Kubernetes, or cloud production changes.
  2. A development team using Claude Code wants to deny risky terminal commands, require approval for Edit/Write operations, and retain session evidence.
  3. A Go developer building a CAP-compatible worker needs governance decisions around handlers registered for `job.*` topics.
  4. A security or compliance team needs a central view of approvals, policy decisions, and audit events across several agent pools.
  5. A team using MCP tool integrations needs a governed path through `cmd/cordum-mcp` in stdio mode or the Gateway endpoints `/mcp/message` and `/mcp/sse`.

What are this agent's strengths and limitations?

Pros
  • The Safety Kernel produces explicit allow, deny, or approval-required decisions before execution rather than only recording outcomes afterward.
  • Cordum Edge provides a Claude Code command hook, local `cordum-agentd`, resolved-approval provenance checks, and redacted evidence export.
  • It combines CAP worker runtime support, MCP stdio/HTTP/SSE interfaces, and Docker Compose plus Helm deployment paths.
  • Published images support linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, and the repository documents cosign keyless OIDC signing for release-tag images.
Limitations
  • A full local deployment requires Docker, Compose, and at least 4 GB of Docker memory; first-run certificate generation also requires Go 1.26.3+.
  • Edge is explicitly documented for Claude Code today; enterprise enforcement additionally depends on managed Claude settings and endpoint controls.
  • The documented compatibility defaults are `CORDUM_SDK_HANDSHAKE=off` and `CORDUM_HEARTBEAT_MODE=authority`; stricter modes require worker proof keys and control-plane signing authorities.
  • The license is BUSL-1.1: internal self-hosting and modification/contribution are permitted, but offering a competing hosted service is not; conversion to Apache-2.0 is dated 2029-01-01.

How do you install or deploy this agent?

Install Docker Desktop v4+ (or Docker Engine v20.10+ with Compose v2), allocate at least 4 GB to Docker, and install Go 1.26.3+ and curl. Run:
git clone https://github.com/cordum-io/cordum.git
cd cordum
./tools/scripts/quickstart.sh
The script starts the full stack and generates secrets and certificates. The dashboard is available at http://localhost:8082; the initial login is admin / ChangeMe123!, which should be changed in .env before exposing the stack.

How do you use this agent?

Load the generated credential: export CORDUM_API_KEY=$(grep CORDUM_API_KEY .env | cut -d= -f2). Submit a first job:
curl -sS --cacert ./certs/ca/ca.crt -X POST https://localhost:8081/api/v1/jobs -H "X-API-Key: $CORDUM_API_KEY" -H "X-Tenant-ID: default" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"topic":"job.default","prompt":"hello"}'
For the built-in three-verdict demonstration, run cordumctl pack install ./demo/quickstart/pack and then cordumctl demo run quickstart. To enable Claude Code Edge against a running stack, set CORDUM_GATEWAY, CORDUM_API_KEY, and CORDUM_TENANT_ID=default, then run ./bin/cordumctl edge claude.

How does this agent compare with similar options?

The repository compares Cordum with Guardrails AI, NeMo Guardrails, and custom middleware. Its stated differentiators are pre-execution Safety Kernel checks, built-in human approvals, multi-agent-pool governance, deterministic audit, framework-agnostic CAP access, MCP Bridge/Gateway support, and a Claude Code local-action firewall. This comparison is the repository's own feature positioning.

FAQ

Is Cordum limited to one model or agent framework?
No. The repository presents CAP as a governance protocol for heterogeneous agent pools and lists Go, Python, and Node SDKs, although each worker still needs CAP integration.
Can it be deployed without building every service from source?
Yes. `docker compose pull && docker compose up -d` uses published images, but that path still requires `go run ./cmd/cordumctl generate-certs` for local certificates and configuration of an API key and Redis password.
How does Claude Code approval avoid authorizing an action from a request event alone?
For approved destructive actions, ProvenanceGate requires a resolved approval record and a canonical resolved approval audit event with the same tenant, `approval_ref`, and `action_hash`; an approval-requested event alone is insufficient.
What credential precautions apply in production?
The quickstart uses a default development password, so the administrator password in `.env` should be changed. The Helm guidance also advises against passing API keys or Redis passwords on the command line because they enter stored Helm values and shell history.

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